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There had never been anything like it. In today's terms,
it was as if an NSA employee had publicly revealed the
complete communications intelligence operations of
the Agency for the past twelve years-all its techniques
and major successes, its organizational structure and
budget-and had, for good measure, included actual
intercepts, decrypts, and translations of the
communications not only of our adversaries but of our
allies as well.'
In the mid-summer of 2013, the British newspaper, The Guardian,
published claims by a contractor for the National Security Agency
(NSA), that millions of telephone records were being collected under
an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Throughout the summer and fall, additional disclosures about
apparent surveillance operations seized headlines around the world.
Accurately interpreting the meaning of the disclosures has been more
complicated, but it is clear that there is great public interest in United
States intelligence activities.
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Partners, LLC. Previously he served as the Executive Director for the Directorate of Plans
and Policy at United States Cyber Command, the Special Counsel for Defense Intelligence
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National Security Agency. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government. This article is derived
entirely from open source material and contains no classified information.
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Despite being fired from his contractor position with Booz Allen
Hamilton2 and charged with espionage and theft, Edward Snowden
continued to provide classified information to The Guardian. The
paper has published more than 300 stories on signals intelligence
methodologies, the statutes and court authorities under which the
United States Intelligence Community conducts these operations, and
the intelligence relationships between foreign governments and the
United States.
These disclosures of sensitive and classified information concern
not only the United States, but also its allies. The material disclosed by
Snowden has implicated the United Kingdom's Government
Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ). British government
concerns about the potential publication of classified data were
significant enough to threaten The Guardian with legal action if the
information was not destroyed. The threats prompted the destruction
of hard drives containing information related to GCHQ.4
The national security implications of Snowden's actions are
significant. According to the most experienced U.S. intelligence
officer, Michael V. Hayden,' "Edward Snowden will likely prove to be
the most costly leaker of America secrets in the history of the
Republic." 6 The Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee has
noted that Snowden has jeopardized U.S. national security by
2 Shashank Bengali, Edward Snowden Fired, BoozAllen Hamilton Says, L.A. TIMES, June
11, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2o13/jun/ii/news/la-pn-edward-
snowden-fired-booz-allen-20130611.
3 James Ball, Edward Snowden NSA Files: Secret Surveillance and Our Revelations So
Far, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 21, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/2/edward-snowden-nsa-files-revelations.
4 Julian Borger, NSA Files: Why The Guardian in London Destroyed Hard Drives of
Leaked Files, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 20, 2013, available at
http://ww.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/2o/nsa-snowden-files-drives-destroyed-
london. This destruction has not prevented the further disclosures of classified data,
however, since the reporter who first broke the story, had additional copies of the material
in Brazil and in the United States. Nicholas Watt et al., NSA Files: UK and US at Odds
Over Destruction of Guardian Hard Drives, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 20, 2013, available at
http://wvww.theguardian.com/world/2o13/aug/2o/nsa-david-miranda-guardian-hard-
drives.
5 General Michael V. Hayden is a career military intelligence officer who led the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and was the first Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence. See generally, Michael Hayden, THE CHERTOFF GROUP,
http://chertoffgroup.com/bios/michael-hayden.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
6 Michael Hayden, Ex-CIA Chief: What Edward Snowden Did, CNN (July 19, 2013),
http://wvww.enn.Com/2o13/O7/19/opinion/hayden-snowden-impact/index.html.
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exposing ongoing U.S. counterterrorism activities.7 The Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "[t]he unauthorized disclosure of a
top secret U.S. court document threatens potentially long-lasting and
irreversible harm to our ability to identify and respond to the many
threats facing our nation."8 There are those, however, that dispute
these claims by current and former high-ranking intelligence officials
and elected representatives. 9
Snowden claims that his disclosures-made in violation of law,
regulation, and his solemn oath-are motivated by his judgment about
the value of the intelligence. He removed and released data that
allegedly shows how the NSA had collected information on civilian
institutions, to include universities, hospitals, and businesses.
Snowden claims these alleged NSA operations are dangerous and
criminal: "These nakedly, aggressively criminal acts are wrong no
matter the target."'" Without referencing the multiple layers of
intelligence oversight within the Department of Defense, the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the NSA's Inspector
General, and the Intelligence Community Inspector General, Snowden
concluded that "the public needs to know the kinds of things a
government does in its name, or the 'consent of the governed' is
meaningless.""
Regardless of one's sympathy for Snowden's conclusion, the scope
and scale of the material he has revealed will have a continuing impact
on U.S. national security. There are four areas where his actions will
7 Evan MeMurry, GOP Rep. Rogers Blasts Snowden: Just Got To North Korea, Iran to
Round Out 'Government Oppression Tour,' MEDIATE (June 23, 2013) available at
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/gop-rep-rogers-blasts-snowden-just-go-to-north-korea-iran-
to-round-out-government-oppression-tour/.
8 Press Release from James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Statement
on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, Office of Director of
National Intelligence (June 6, 2013) available at
http://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/868-
dni-statement-on-recent-unauthorized-diselosures-of-classified-information.
9 See generally Jon Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Secret Without Reason and Costly
Without Accomplishment: Questioning the NSA's Metadata Program, 9 ISJLP
(forthcoming, Spring 2014) available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Mueller- and- Stewart.pdf;
Klayman v. Obama, CV 13-o881 (RJL), 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
10 Edward Snowden: NSA Whistleblower Answers Reader Questions, THE GUARDIAN,
June 17, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/edward-
snowden-nsa-files-whistleblower.
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diminish national security. First, the disclosure of the programs,
relationships, and operations will facilitate operational changes in the
behavior of adversarial groups such as al-Qaeda and Hamas. 2 It will
become more difficult, more expensive, and more time consuming to
collect and analyze information on terrorist groups, foreign
governments, and foreign militaries.
Second, the disclosures will complicate U.S. foreign relations that
directly contribute to U.S. security interests. Cooperation between
U.S. and foreign intelligence organizations is critical to the security of
the U.S." Other countries are perpetually concerned about disclosing
sensitive information collected by their intelligence services. Snowden
has now exacerbated these concerns and weakened traditionally
strong American assurances that information provided to the U.S. will
be well protected with little risk of embarrassment or compromise to
the providing country. It will become more difficult to cooperate with
these partners when there is a stream of evidence that shows that the
U.S. cannot keep a secret.
Third, Snowden's actions have impaired cooperation between the
United States government and the U.S. private sector. It was already
challenging to share information between the U.S. public and private
sectors, 4 but the exposure of alleged relationships-whether voluntary
or pursuant to a court order-between companies such as Verizon,
Google, and Facebook has made corporate entities recoil from the U.S.
government in fear of a diminished reputation or decline in stock
value.
Finally, despite Snowden's claimed objective of exposing an
"architecture of oppression,"'5 his violation of law, regulation, and
12 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2005, 11 (Apr.
2oo6) available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf.
13 The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding highlights the
importance of sharing with partner nations, "our national security depends upon an ability
to make information easily accessible to Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private
sector, and foreign partners in a trusted manner, given the appropriate mission context."
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING AND
SAFEGUARDING 7 (Dec. 2012) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/does/2012sharingstrategy-i.pdf.
14 See generally, Jennifer Martinez & Ramsey Cox, Senate Votes Down Lieberman, Collins
Cybersecurity Act a Second Time, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2012, 11:12 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/268053-senate-rejects-eybersecurity-
act-for-second-time.
15 Laura Poitras & Glenn Greenwald, NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden: 'I Don't Want
to Live in a Society That Does These Sort of Things'-Video at 7:00, THE GUARDIAN (June
9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/o9/nsa-whistleblower-
edward-snowden-interview-video.
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oath has eroded the confidence of the American public he was hoping
to inform. In our representative democracy, this loss of public
confidence will quickly transform into fewer resources for the very
departments and agencies that enhance American security. Less
authority and more scrutiny are sure to follow. It is understandable,
but the reduction in funding, authority, and the increase in oversight
are the type of emotionally satisfying reactions that will add nothing to
U.S. national security.
These four consequences of Snowden's illegal exposures of
classified data will diminish U.S. national security particularly in the
short term. It is possible that the reforms and examination of
technical collection and analysis will become stronger in the long
term, but this is unlikely in the context of rapidly diminishing
government funding, continuing economic hardships, and the erosion
of the public appreciation for security threats. Not all the comments
from public and private officials have been accurate or helpful,
however.
Some national security officials have "welcomed the debate"
surrounding the collection of metadata.16 In this volume, Mueller and
Stewart note that the debate is "much overdue."'17 This debate has
been ongoing within the national security establishment for decades.
The balance between the perils and necessity of governmental secrecy
has been a preoccupation of our Republic since its founding.1S Privacy
debates surrounding electronic surveillance can be traced to the early
1900s:
Congress enacted the first federal wiretap statute as a
temporary measure to prevent disclosure of
government secrets during World War I. Later, it
proscribed intercepting and divulging private radio
messages in the Radio Act of 1927, but did not
immediately reestablish a federal wiretap prohibition.
By the time of the landmark Supreme Court decision in
16 See, e.g., U.S. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President at the Fairmont
Hotel, San Jose, California (June 7, 2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-offlce/2o13/o6/o7/statement-president; Dan De Luce, Snowden Leaks Sparked
Welcome Debate: US Spy Chief, AFP, Sept. 12, 2013, available at
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/arficle/ALeqM5hJplx8BXL3hPYmyqNJ3vnbA
TMw?docld=CNG.c782a92a91496366ee7o5f89aid7523.481.
17 Mueller & Stewart, supra note 9.
18 See generally, Gabriel Schoenfeld, Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and
the Rule of Law 55 (2010).
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Olmstead, however, at least forty-one of the forty-eight
states had banned wiretapping or forbidden telephone
and telegraph employees and officers from disclosing
the content of telephone or telegraph messages or
both.19
Within the past ten years, there has been vigorous debate in the
media and within Congress surrounding the scope and volume of
data-including metadata relating to U.S. persons-the U.S.
government was allowed to collect and analyze.20 This debate is only
new-or overdue-to those who have chosen to avoid engagement in a
most difficult of legal and policy issues.
Perhaps there are those who feel as if there has been insufficient
discussion of surveillance matters because they do not understand the
mechanisms of intelligence oversight that have existed in the United
States since the 1970s. The public does not have an unrestricted right
to access information determined by the President to be classified.2'
The public is represented, including in the oversight of classified
intelligence matters, by its elected officials. Declassified documents
demonstrate that the public's elected officials-our representatives in
the classified realm-were privy to the collection of bulk metadata
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.22 This correspondence
encourages the members of the congressional intelligence committees
to provide the classified information to other congressional members
19 GINA MARIE STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, PRIVACY: AN
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING 2 (2009).
2o See, e.g., ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34143, P.L. 110-55, THE
PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007: MODIFICATIONS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2007); RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30252,
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO THE U.S.
(200)("[g]iven the clear possibility that the international role of law enforcement agencies
will continue to grow, observers believe that greater consideration should be given to
making less ambiguous distinctions between law enforcement and security policy and to
the relationships between law enforcement and intelligence agencies."); JENNIFER ELSEA,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RS21472, PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) UNDER S. 113, (2003); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL31377, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002).
21 See generally Exec. Order No. 13526, 3 C.F.R. 13526 (2009).
22 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITYAGENCY'S BULK
COLLECTION PROGRAMS AFFECTED BY THE USA PATRIOTACT REAUTHORIZATION (2009).
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because it would "be an effective way to inform the legislative debate
about reauthorization of Section 215. "23
Elected officials charged with oversight of intelligence within the
House of Representatives also have the ability to disclose classified
information. According to the Rules of the House of Representatives
for the 113 th Congress: "Nothing [within the House rules] shall be
construed to prevent the select committee from publically disclosing
classified information in a case in which it determines that national
interest in the disclosure of classified information clearly outweighs
any infringement on the privacy of a person.
24
Thus, this debate has raged since the birth of our democracy and
that elected officials have engaged in this debate on our behalf for a
decade (this debate has increased in intensity since September 11,
2001). Those charged with representing the public interest in
classified matters not only have been well-informed of the activities
under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, but also have the legal
authority to disclose these programs if they determined that it was in
the national interest.
The current administration's National Security Strategy, published
in May 2010 provides the focus for an examination of the impacts of
the Snowden disclosures. 25  This strategy prioritizes American
leadership by "shaping an international order that can meet the
challenges of our time" and "recognizes the fundamental connection
between our national security, our national competitiveness,
resilience, and moral example., 26 U.S. national security interests are:
Strengthening Security and Resilience at Home, the Disruption,
Dismantling, and Defeat of al-Qaeda and its Violent Extremist
Affiliates, the Use of Force only as a last resort, the Reverse of the
Spread of Nuclear and Biological Weapons, the Advancement of
Peace, Security, and Opportunity in the Greater Middle East, the
Investment in the Capacity of Strong and Capable Partners, and the
Securing of Cyberspace.
Consistent with the U.S. national security interests are the global
and regional threats outlined by the DNI in April 2013. The Increasing
23 Id.
24 KAREN HAAS, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 11 3 TH CONGRESS 15 (2013)
available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.
25 U.S. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/national-security-strategy.pdf
[hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
26 Id. at 1.
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Risk to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, Eroding U.S. Economic and
National Security, and Information Control and Internet Governance
put cybersecurity at the top of the DNI's Worldwide Threat
Assessment.27 Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were also listed as global
threats. With respect to regional threats, Middle East, and North
Africa (Egypt, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Libya) were
listed as threats because the transitioning governments within this
region are at risk of failing to "address public demands for change"
and "are likely to revive unrest and heighten the appeal of
authoritarian or extremist solutions., 28 The information disclosed by
Snowden is negatively affecting the national security community's
ability to collect and analyze information concerning each of these
regional and transnational threats.
I. OPERATIONAL SHIFTS
"Discussing programs like this publicly will have an
impact on the behavior of our adversaries and make it
more difficult for us to understand their intentions. "29
The classified material published by The Guardian and other
media describes in significant detail the methodologies apparently
employed by the NSA in the conduct of its mission. Established in
1952, the NSA produces signals intelligence30 and protects U.S.
communications from interception. According to David Kahn, "[i]n
intelligence, [the NSA] intercepts, traffic-analyzes, and cryptoanalyzes
the messages of other nations, friend as well as foe."'" In addition, the
NSA executes "the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as
executive agent for the communications security of the United States
27 Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm.,
113 th Cong 2 (2013)(statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence)
available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%2oReports/2013%2oWWTA%20US%2
oIC%2oSFR%20%2oHPSCI%2011%2oApr%202013.pdf.
28 Id. at 14.
29 Press Release, supra note 8.
30 Intelligence comprising communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence.
31 DAVID KAHN, THE CODE BREAKERS: THE COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF SECRET
COMMUNICATION FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE INTERNET 675 (2d ed. 1996).
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Government."32 This means that the agency must provide technical
and practical means to ensure that no other parties can benefit from
the collection of U.S. communications.
Current examples of the NSA's contributions to national security
are difficult to find because of the sensitivity of the agency's mission.
In recent congressional testimony, however, the DNI said that SIGINT
is the primary contributor to counterterrorism intelligence and that
multiple empirical studies have shown that signal intelligence,
provided by the NSA, is the major contributor to answering the
hardest intelligence challenges faced by the U.S.33
Although the claims in these books are unconfirmed, publications
such as Counter Strike: The Untold Story of America's Secret
Campaign Against Al Qaeda by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker and
Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of
Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory by Lieutenant Colonel Anthony
Shaffer suggest that the NSA may have prevented significant terrorist
attacks and provided critical intelligence during U.S. military
operations.
These books, together with the claims of senior intelligence
officials before Congress, strongly suggest that the NSA's efforts are
the most effective shield against the acts of violence that harm U.S.
and allied military members, Americans, and our national security
interests. In response to apparent disclosures of NSA activities,
President Obama directed the declassification of sensitive NSA
collection conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA). In September 2013, multiple documents concerning "bulk
telephony metadata" collection under Section 501 of FISA were
declassified and publically released by the ODNI.34 These disclosures
included a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court finding of
reasonable grounds that the call records were relevant to an
authorized terrorism investigation.3" The same order required the
32 Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (2oo8).
33 USHR19 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence at 4:36, USTREAM (Oct. 29, 2013)
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/40304984.
34 DNI Clapper Declassifies Additional Intelligence Community Documents Regarding
Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence Newsroom (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/91-press-releases-2013/954-
dni-clapper-declassifies- additional-intelligence-community-documents-regarding-
collection-under-section-501-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act (FISA Section
501 was amended by Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001).
35 In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for An Order Requiring The
Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], Docket No. BR 06-05 at 3 (FISA Ct.
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NSA to establish "mandatory procedures strictly to control access to
and use of the archived data collected pursuant to [the court's]
order." 6 Additionally, the order mandated that the NSA's General
Counsel monitor the designation of those with access to the data and
act as an approval authority for the actual queries analysts wished to
make of the data. 7
In late October 2013, the ODNI released a number of additional
documents related to the NSA's alleged collection programs. These
documents include a 20o9 NSA congressional notification describing
the failure to comply with a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
order,38 and a March 2009 Internal NSA Memorandum of
Understanding required for access and query privileges of data
collected through the NSA's bulk telephony metadata program.39
These documents describe the legal justifications for and technical
detail about how the NSA collects and uses intelligence.
This information was declassified and publically released to
inform the public about what data was collected and analyzed by the
NSA, to balance inaccurate speculations by the media about the NSA,
and to facilitate the debate about U.S. Intelligence Community
operations. When examined together, the information disclosed by
Snowden and the declassified information released by the ODNI
present a positive picture of prudent measures for national security. If
the information about programs such as PRISM, FAIRVIEW, or
OAKSTAR is accurate, then it appears as if the Intelligence
Community has not only adjusted well to global technical
advancements in telecommunications, but also learned significant
lessons from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
2006) available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pubMay%2o24%2o2oo6%2oOrder%2ofro
m%2oFISC.pdf.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 5-6.
38 VITO T. POTENZA, MEMORANDUM FOR THE STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITFEE ON INTELLIGENCE, CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION: INCIDENTS OF
NONCOMPLIANCE-INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (Feb. 25, 2009) available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/51/25%2oFeb%2009%2oNSA%2oCNSealedFINA
L.pdf.
39 The form can be found at: Office of Director of National Intelligence, Memorandum of
Understanding s214 HNCs,
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/5oi/Mem%2oof%2oUnderstanding%2ofor%2oH2I
4%2oHMCsSealed%2oFINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
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It was known in early 2001 that the NSA's effectiveness was
challenged by the "multiplicity of new types of communications links,
by the widespread availability of low-cost encryption systems, and by
changes in the international environment in which dangerous security
threats can come from small, but well organized, terrorist groups as
well as hostile nation states."4 Any challenge about the value of an
intelligence program must address the importance of data quantity
and quality. First, since intelligence analysis depends on having access
to relevant information, logic dictates that more data is always better.
As noted by Mark Lowenthal:
The issue then becomes how to extract the intelligence
from the mountain of information. One answer would
be to increase the number of analysts who deal with the
incoming intelligence, but that raises further demands
on the budget. Another possible response, even less
palatable, would be to collect less. But, even then, there
would be no assurance that the "wheat" remained in
the smaller volume still being collected.4'
Thus, quantity has an intelligence quality all its own. In addition,
the type of information needed by the Intelligence Community is also
important. Given the priorities noted in the National Security
Strategy, the importance of NSA collection and analysis as noted in
congressional testimony and the ever-present threats by terrorist
groups and hostile nations the American public should vigorously
endorse the type of programs viewed by Snowden as oppressive. It is
troubling to see the disclosure of techniques allegedly used by the NSA
to obtain "cryptographic details of commercial cryptographic
information security systems through industry relationships,"4" and
the rampant speculation about the monitoring of the mobile phones of
the heads of state from Europe.
It is not only logic that leads one to believe in the value of NSA
collection, but also testimony by intelligence professionals. For
example, according to the House Intelligence Committee, NSA
activities have "been integral in preventing multiple terrorist attacks,
40 RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL3o74o SUMMARY, THE NATIONAL
SECURITYAGENCY: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2001).
41 MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 55 (2000).
42 NSA: Classification Guide for Crgyptanalysis, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/05/nsa-classification-guide-
cryptanalysis.
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including a plot to attack [sic] the New York Stock Exchange in
2009."43 The PRISM program, a program reported to provide the NSA
access to information from some of the largest technology companies,
provided "critical leads" to disrupt more than fifty potential terrorist
events in more than twenty countries. According to officials, the FISA
authority-the congressional authorization to target communications
of foreign persons who are located abroad for foreign intelligence
purposes-contributed to more than ninety percent of these
disruptions.44
The Deputy Attorney General has noted that the FBI benefited
from the NSA's Section 702 collection in the fall of 2009. Using
Section 702 collection and "while monitoring the activities of [al-
Qaeda] terrorists in Pakistan, the [NSA] noted contact from an
individual in the U.S. that the [FBI] subsequently identified as
Colorado-based Najibulla Zazi. The U.S. Intelligence Community,
including the FBI and NSA, worked in concert to determine his
relationship with [al-Qaeda], as well as identify any foreign or
domestic terrorist links."45
The FBI tracked Zazi as he traveled to New York to
meet with co-conspirators, where they were planning to
conduct a terrorist attack. Zazi and his co-conspirators
were subsequently arrested. Zazi, upon indictment,
pled guilty to conspiring to bomb the NYC subway
system. Compelled collection (authorized under
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, Section
702) against foreign terrorists was critical to the
discovery and disruption of this threat against the
U.S.4 6
43 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Chairman Mike Rogers and Ranking Member Dutch Ruppersberger Urge
Support of Important NSA Counterterrorism Tool (July 23, 2013) available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/press-release/chairman-mike-rogers-and-ranking-member-
dutch-ruppersberger-urge-support-important-nsa.
44 National Security Agency Data Collections Programs at 37:30, C-SPAN (June 18, 2013),
http://www.c-span.org/video/?313429-1/nsa-chief-testifies-damage-surveillance-leaks
[hereinafter CSPAN HPSCI Hearing].
45 FOUR DECLASSIFIED EXAMPLES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, available at http://intelligence.house.gov/i -four-
declassified-examples- more-5 -attacks -2 0 countries -thwarted-nsa-collection-under-fisa-
section (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
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Regardless of the accuracy of the information released by Snowden,
the types of programs described by the material appear to directly
contribute to national security; its release, regardless of its validity,
will negatively impact U.S. security.
Homegrown Violent Extremists47 continue to be inspired by global
jihadist propaganda and the perceived success of plots such as the
November 2009 attack at Fort Hood, Texas and the March 2012
attacks by an al-Qaeda-inspired extremist in Toulouse, France.48 The
threat from terror groups remains constant, urgent, and of great
concern to the U.S. Intelligence Community. The revelations
concerning the NSA's counterterrorism successes will motivate terror
groups to reexamine how they communicate, plan, and execute these
attacks.
Despite these publically acknowledged examples of the value of
the bulk metadata program, multiple reports and a federal district
court opinion have denied its efficacy. The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board49 recommends discontinuing the program. The board
noted, "an intelligence-gathering tool with significant ramifications
for privacy and civil liberties cannot be regarded as justified merely
because it provides some value in protecting the nation from
terrorism."50
A panel of advisors that included former government officials such
as Richard Clarke (former National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism), Michael J. Morell
(former deputy director of the CIA), and Cass Sunstein (former head
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama
47 See generally JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416, AMERICAN
JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 5 (2013) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/ers/terror/R41416.pdf ([h]omegrown violent extremists are
jihadist-inspired American citizens or legal permanent residents that plan or conduct
terrorist attacks on the United States).
48 Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm.,
supra note 27, at 4.
49 An independent, bipartisan agency within the executive branch established by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, Pub. L. 110-53, signed into
law in August 2007; successor to the Board created within the Executive Office of the
President under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Privacy
and Civil Liberties Board, http://www.pelob.gov/.
50 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 145 (Jan. 23, 2014) available at
http://www.pelob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-
Records-Program.pdf.
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White House) did not recommend the cessation of the bulk metadata
program. In an unreleased report, commissioned by the president in
August, the panel "went further than some of the agency's backers in
Congress, who would make only cosmetic changes to it, but stopped
short of calling for the program to be shut down, as its critics have
urged."'" They did, however question its value: "The [NSA] uses the
telephone data to search for links between people in an effort to
identify hidden associates of terrorism suspects, but the report says it
'was not essential to preventing attacks.' ''52
The panel's report was provided to the president three days after a
federal judge determined, in a case seeking an injunction to stop the
NSA program, that the Government failed to cite a "single instance in
which the analysis of the NSA's bulk metadata collection actually
stopped an imminent attack or otherwise aided the government in
achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature., 53 United
States District Judge Richard J. Leon came to a dramatically different
conclusion than United States District Judge William Pauley in
similar cases dealing with the same program.
54
In this volume, Mueller and Stewart claim that "the achievements
of [the bulk metadata program] do seem to be decidedly
underwhelming," despite acknowledging that in at least four cases,
analysis of the metadata contributed to the arrest or locating of known
terrorists or facilitators.55 Their analysis is flawed in the same way as
is Judge Leon's and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. The
comments made by critics of the program appear to be motivated
more by ideology than dispassionate assessment of analytical
tradecraft. The complexities, technology, and ambiguity of the modern
security environment make it unlikely that any single intelligence
source or program will provide a "smoking gun" on a national security
5, David E. Sanger and Charlie Savage, Obama Is Urged to Sharply Curb N.S.A. Data
Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.Com/2013/12/19/us/polities/report-on-nsa-surveillance-
tactics.html?pagewanted=i&_r=o.
52 Id.
53 Klayman v. Obama, CV 13-0851 (RJL)(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
54 In ACLU v. Clapper, United States District Judge William Pauley granted a motion by
the government to dismiss a suit filed in June by several groups led by the ACLU seeking to
block the program authorized by Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. He rejected the ACLU's
concerns about what could be done with these data and their contention that other less-
intrusive means could lead to the same information. No. 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,
2013).
55 Mueller & Stewart, supra note 9.
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threat. 6 The Intelligence Community has sharpened its techniques
since September 11, 2001 with this new reality in mind.
The complexity of the international system, incomplete and
inconsistent information, and the "inherent limitations of the human
mind" are perennial problems for intelligence professionals. 57 To
overcome these realities, the Intelligence Community must apply a
dizzying set of analytic techniques and mental discipline to review key
assumptions about their operational tasks, validate the quality of the
information collected and available to them, identify indicators of
actualized threats, and continually strive to anticipate the thinking of
those who seek to harm U.S. citizens or the security interests of the
United States and our allies. This is no small task and it requires a
mosaic of information, to include bulk metadata.
Judge Leon at least acknowledged his unfamiliarity with the
complexities of any conversation about bulk metadata collection and
analysis. By staying his order to discontinue the program, he concedes
that the data may be of critical importance to national security: "[I]n
light of the significant national security interests at stake in this case
and the novelty of the constitutional issues, I will stay my order
pending appeal."'
8
Examples of the efficacy of the program are provided below, yet
the public should keep in mind the unsatisfying fact that intelligence
analysis is a laborious process that requires reason and passion. The
author concedes that none of these examples provides an irrefutable
defense of the accessing of bulk metadata. The program does,
however, provide a valuable link in the national security chain.
Although frustrating to the intelligence professionals who devote a
large portion of their professional lives to the protection of the
security, and civil liberties, of all U.S. citizens the debate is welcome,
yet certainly not new.
Critics and supporters alike must ask themselves whether they
consider the evidence provided by intelligence professionals and those
we have elected to oversee them or allow passion to cloud our
judgment and poison our vision. Tom Nichols, professor of National
56 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Board report highlights this inappropriate expectation in
the following statement: "[W]e have not identified a single instance involving a threat to
the United States in which the telephone records program made a concrete difference in
the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation." PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES BOARD,
supra note 50, at 146.
57 See generally U.S. Government, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytics Techniques
for Improving Intelligence Analysis 1 (Mar. 2009).
58 Klayman, CV 13-o851.
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Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, recently commented on
this sort of rejection of expertise in his blog, The War Room: "A fair
number of Americans now seem to reject the notion that one person is
more likely to be right about something, due to education, experience,
or other attributes of achievement, than any other."59 Nichols'
assessment is directly applicable to the critics of the bulk metadata
collection program. No matter what evidence intelligence
professionals proffer, no matter what fifteen Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court judges have concluded on more than thirty
occasions, no matter what elected officials charged with oversight of
these activities say, it will be insufficient to those who are outraged in
their ignorance that these programs ever existed. Despite the claim
that the "benefits provided [by the bulk metadata program] have been
minimal," the following examples illustrate the advantages of the
program.
A. Terror Groups
It is likely that terrorist groups will change how they conceive,
plan, and execute terrorist attacks as a result of the classified
intelligence information now exposed to the public. Terrorist groups
continuously adjust their methodologies for attacking their targets,6"
but the recent disclosures provide a roadmap for terror groups to
avoid detection.
A similar example of how terrorist groups adjust their planning
and communication techniques in response to the disclosure of
classified information is found in the 9/11 Commission Report.
Referring to a 1998 Washington Times story disclosing that Osama
Bin Laden communicated via a satellite phone, the Commission noted
that al-Qaeda's senior leadership "had stopped using a particular
means of communication almost immediately after a leak to The
Washington Times. This made it much more difficult for the NSA to
intercept his conversations." 61 Despite the controversy surrounding
59 Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise, THE WAR ROOM: TOM NICHOLS ON POLITICS AND
FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 11, 2013), http://tomnichols.net/blog/2o13/12/n1/the-death-of-
expertise.
60 According to the Director of National Intelligence, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
remains focused on attacks on US soil and "continues to adjust its tactics, techniques and
procedures for targeting the West." Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the
House Permanent Select Comm., supra note 27, at 3.
61 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 127
(2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
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this story, it makes logical sense that terror groups will not use
technologies reportedly monitored by those who seek to disrupt their
plans.
Similar changes in terror group practices can be anticipated with
the Snowden disclosures. The details of how intelligence targets will
alter their practices are speculative given the obscurity of terrorist
methodologies, but a few points are clear.
If the reports are true and the NSA can exploit62 the "worldwide
use of nine U.S.-based Internet service providers, including Google,
Yahoo, Skype, and YouTube," then it is reasonable to assume that
terrorist groups using these technologies or services will discontinue
use of these services. According to the New York Post, the Snowden
disclosures resulted in jihadists posting Arabic news articles about
[NSA's capabilities] ... and recommended fellow jihadists to be very
cautious, not to give their real phone number and other such
information when registering for a website." 63 Similar posts
recommending jihadists use "privacy-protecting email systems like
TOR, also called The Onion Router, to hide their computer's IP
address, and to use encrypted links to access jihadi forums, 64 provide
direct evidence that the recent disclosures will change how terrorists
plan and conduct their attacks.
Another example concerns alleged NSA access to Skype.
Purchased by Microsoft in 2011, Skype claims to employ encryption to
protect users from hackers and criminals. 65 Documents published by
The Guardian suggest that the NSA may have had access to Skype
servers.66 Despite this suggested access, others claim that Skype calls
made to other Skype customers were untraceable because of Skype's
corporate location.
62 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DICTIONARY OF MILITARYAND ASSOCIATED TERMS JOINT PUBLICATION 1-
02 92 (2010) ('Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical,
operational, or strategic purposes.").
63 Post Staff Report, Terrorists to Ditch Skype and YouTube After Leaks RevealNSA
Surveillance Tactics, N.Y. POST (June 26, 2013),
http://nypost.COm/2013/o6/26/terrorists-to-ditch-skype-and-youtube-after-leaks-reveal-
nsa-surveillance-tacties/.
64 Id.
65 Does Skype use Encryption? SKYPE.COM, https://support.skype.com/en/faq/FA31/does-
skype-use-eneryption?frompage=search&q=eneryption&fromSearchFirstPage=false (last
visited Feb. 28, 2014).
66 NSA Prism Program Slides, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/o/prism-slides-nsa-
document.
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Skype is located in Luxembourg (outside of the United
States), and... [encryption] keys used by Skype cannot
be turned over to the FBI because Skype does not hold
the keys themselves. The key is only known by the
computers using the program to connect with each
other, and Internet communication is inherently hard
to trace because of how packets can be routed.67
As early as 2011, reports described how terrorist use of Skype was
hindering law enforcement in India. According to the Times of India,
"[t]errorist organizations targeting India have moved their
communications significantly to Internet and other possible
innovative means, denying Indian intelligence agencies any major
breakthrough yet in their post-Mumbai blasts investigations." 68
Kashmiri terrorists are reportedly using smart phones and Skype
according to a senior Indian Army officer. Terrorists, like the general
population, migrate to technologies that enhance communications.
The popularity and proliferation of Skype supports the hypothesis that
international terror groups have used Skype.
Regardless of the validity of the reports of NSA access to Skype
servers or the inability of access to Skype communications, the new
attention to alleged Skype vulnerabilities will encourage illicit users to
move to other technologies. By exposing real or imagined capabilities
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, potential state and non-state
targets of electronic surveillance are better equipped to avoid
surveillance by avoiding specific technologies and technical services.
One such service is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) network. SWIFT, a member-owned
cooperative, enables the standardized exchange of proprietary
financial data such as payments, securities, and bank commodity
trades.69 Financial transactions, such as those facilitated by SWIFT,
67 Luke Brady, Talk Like a Terrorist: Use Skype, UNITED LIBERTY (Nov. 21, 2OO8),
http://www.unitedliberty.org/articles/talk-like-a-terrorist-use-skype (However, see Nicole
Perlroth, Jeff Larson and Scott Shane, N.SA. Able Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/o6/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-
encryption.html?hp&pagewanted=all&_r=o).
68 Josy Joseph, Terrorists Move to Skype, Frustrate Eavesdroppers, THE TIMES OF INDIA
(July 19, 2011), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2o11-07-
19/india/2979o655 1 satellite-phones-intelligence-agencies-thuraya.
69 See generally SWIFT COMPANY, www.swift.com (specific information on FIN traffic
available at
http://www.swift.com/assets/swift-com/documents/about swift/SIF-2013-09.pdf).
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are a direct concern to counterterrorism officials. The 9/11
Commission noted, "[v]igorous efforts to track terrorist financing
must remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The
government has recognized that information about terrorist money
helps us understand their network, search them out, and disrupt their
operations."7
In support of this understanding, an intergovernmental
policymaking group established to address money-laundering issues
in 1989 expanded its mission to include "identifying sources and
methods of terrorist financing and adopted nine special
recommendations on terrorist financing to track terrorists' funds."'"
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, comprising
thirty-six member countries, develops and promotes "policies to
combat money laundering and terrorist financing."72
Because terror financing became a priority well before September
11, 2001, the European Union and the United States began to permit
U.S. agencies "limited access to bank data transferred through the
SWIFT network."73 The agreement supported the U.S. Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program established after the September 11
attacks.74 Recent disclosures have focused attention on the data
reportedly accessed by the NSA.
In response to this arrangement being made public, the European
Union has threatened to "suspend or even terminate the crucial EU-
U.S. Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme."75 The national security
impact of this disclosure is the potential loss of an apparently valued
source of financial intelligence.7 The importance of terrorist financing
is self-evident. If, pursuant to an international agreement, the NSA
had access to international money transfers, it is reasonable to believe
70 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 382.
71 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21904, THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE: AN OVERVIEWAT "SUMMARY" (2012) available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/ers/terror/RS21904.pdf.
72 Id. at 1.
73 Jerin Mathew, Edward Snowden NSA Scandal: EU to Suspend US Data Sharing After
Swift's Interbank Messaging System Breach, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Sept. 25,
2013), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/edward-snowden-nsa-scandal-swift-tftp-eu-5o8882.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22030, U.S.-EU COOPERATION AGAINST
TERRORISM (2013) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ers/row/RS22o3o.pdf.
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that U.S. Intelligence Community was well positioned to interdict the
planning and execution of violent actions against the United States or
her allies. If financial transfer information becomes unavailable as a
result of the illicit disclosures of collection of networks such as SWIFT,
then U.S. understanding and ability to prevent terrorist actions is
significantly degraded.
Snowden's disclosures have already changed terror group's
practices making it more difficult for U.S. intelligence agencies to
provide warnings about terror groups' plans and intentions. The loss
of insight into these targets diminishes U.S. security, but also prevents
the U.S. from sharing information with its allies and partners,
diminishing U.S. global influence. The net effect of Snowden's
disclosures is to increase terrorist consciousness of their own
vulnerabilities. Their response has been immediate and may have a
dangerous cumulative effect.77
II. FOREIGN RELATIONS
However the Snowden episode turns out . . . what it
mainly illustrates is that we are living in an age of
American impotence. The Obama administration has
decided it wants out from nettlesome foreign
entanglements, and now finds itself surprised that it's
running out of foreign influence.78
Beyond the national security impact of making terrorist intentions
and plans harder to discover and the change in practices of terrorist
and opposition groups, Snowden's release of classified information
will diminish national security by degrading U.S. foreign relations.
American security relies heavily on foreign partnerships that have
increased in breadth and scope since September 11, 2001.
Foreign governments are likely to share less information and
require more scrutiny of future interactions with U.S. intelligence and
no country allegedly targeted for collection is pleased to see the public
reports about it. Rising anti-Americanism will strain already tense
relationships with countries such as Russia and China; European
Union officials have expressed outrage over the Snowden
77 See generally GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE
MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW 121 (2010).
78 Bret Stephens, The Age of American Impotence, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB400014241278873246375o457856553o512o4894
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disclosures.79 The reports have already distracted the U.S. and
Russian delegations during the August 2013 G-20 Summit in Russia
during which tensions about Snowden's extradition and asylum status
were unresolved. 8o
In addition to diplomatic relationships, U.S. intelligence agencies
have extensive relationships with foreign intelligence services. Not
only will diplomatic interactions be more difficult, but the intelligence
relationships will be challenged as well. U.S. intelligence has good
relations with many foreign intelligence services despite what one may
read in the press during periods of heightened intelligence interest.
The DNI has the authority to establish intelligence arrangements
with foreign governments.8 The Director of the CIA has a mandate to
"conduct foreign intelligence liaison relationships with intelligence or
security services of foreign governments or international
organizations .... "82 The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
is also required to "conduct foreign defense intelligence liaison
relationships and defense intelligence exchange programs with foreign
defense establishments, intelligence or security services of foreign
governments ... ."83 The Director of the NSA has a similar mandate:
The Director of the NSA shall "conduct foreign cryptologic liaison
relationships .. ""
Each of these mandated liaison relationships will likely suffer
because of the recent disclosures. These relationships can sour if
foreign public opinion becomes dissatisfied with U.S. activities that
may occur in secret, but with the approval of other heads of state.
79 David Jackson, Obama, MerkelAgree to Talks on U.S. Spying, USA TODAY (July 4, 2013,
12:46 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2o13/o7/o4/obama-merkel-
snowden-surveillance-leaks/2488927/.
8o See generally Stephanie Condon, Obama "Reevaluating" Summit with Russia After
Snowden Asylum, CBSN (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/1oo989o42 and Putin,
Obama to Meet at G-2o Despite Snowden Flap, CNBC (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-reevaluating-summit-with-russia-after-snowden-
asylum/.
81 Exec. Order No. 12333, supra note 32, at § 1.3(b)(4)(A).
82Id. at § 1.7(a)(5).
83 Id.
84 Id. at § 1.7 (c)(8).
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A. Russia
The disclosure of alleged intelligence collection may have shifted
the balance of moral authority toward Moscow as global awareness of
the reported NSA programs proliferated. Russian President Vladimir
Putin has been emboldened by the Snowden revelations as illustrated
by his actions concerning Syria since the first release of data by The
Guardian on June 5, 2013.
Russia's goal in Syria before the release of the classified
information was to avoid a "[w]estern-backed effort at coercive regime
change.""5 Russia has been anxious about the popularity of Islamist
groups in predominantly Sunni Muslim countries after the Arab
Spring revolutions.86 Russia attributes the growth of these groups to
U.S. attempts to spread democracy throughout the Middle East.8 7
Thus, President Putin's political motivations have traditionally been
more about domestic stability than about expanding Russia's foreign
influence.88 There was much speculation about how the events in Syria
would be addressed by the G-20 summit. Analysts reported that Putin
was unlikely to discuss the topic.89
Despite this anxiety, Russia was relatively subdued on Syria until
after the Snowden revelations. Emboldened by the growing global
discontent with the U.S., Putin became more vocal on Syria and on
U.S. foreign policy. His most dramatic maneuver was to publish an
85 Samuel Charap & Jeremy Shapiro, How the US Can Move Russia on Syria, AL-MONITOR
(July 22, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/syria-russia-
geneva-engagement-peace-process -us -interests.html.
86 Fiona Hill, The Survivalist in the Kremlin, PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 4, 2013),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/putin-s-rigid- approach-to-protecting-
russia-by-fiona-hill.
87 Id.
88 Fred Dews, What Will Russia Do if the U.S. Strikes Syria, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Aug.
28, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/o8/28-what-will-
russia-do-if-us-strikes-syria (According to Brookings Institute Senior Fellow Cliff Gaddy,
"[t]he whole point of their policy on Syria is that they are trying to protect themselves.
What they are afraid of is instability. Not really caring that much about who is in power as
long as the people in power in the country control the forces within their borders as best
they see. I don't think that he has a plan [for Syria] but the overall plan is somehow to
protect Russia from the bad things that are happening.").
89 U.S.-Russia Reporter Roundtable Moderated by Tina Trenkner, Communications
Coordinator of Foreign Policy, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE at 11 (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.brooldngs.edu/~/media/research/files/interviews/2o13/o8/29%s20u 2rus
sia% 2orelations/us%2orussia%2 orelations%20g20%2osyria%2oarms%2ocontrol.pdf.
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opinion article in the New York Times on September 11, 2013.
According to Fiona Hill, of the Brookings Institute:
Russian President Vladimir Putin has done it again,
grabbing American and international attention with
his New York Times op-ed cautioning the United States
against the use of force in Syria, and scolding America
for considering itself exceptional. Putin's piece has
been met with surprise and outrage in the U.S., but its
basic message has resonated with groups opposed to a
unilateral U.S. strike against regime of Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad. Putin has put himself right where he
wants to be, at the top of the headlines on Syria, and
writing the script for where the United States will have
to take the crisis next: Back to the United Nations.90
Other circumstances concerning Syria undoubtedly helped
encourage Putin to be more vocal,9' but Russia is viewed by many as
having taken the diplomatic high ground against President Obama's
threat of military force. It is not difficult to interpret Putin's
emboldened message, since he was considering and then granted
temporary asylum to Edward Snowden while the debate on Syria was
taking shape.
B. European Union.
Traditionally, strong diplomatic and intelligence sharing
relationships with members of the European Union have also been
strained by revelations of programs allegedly collecting the personal
90 Fiona Hill, Lessons in Communication from Vladimir Putin, MSNBC (Sept. 14, 2013),
http://www.msnbe.com/msnbc/lessons-communication-vladimir-putin#discussions.
91 "First came the British parliamentary vote blocking Prime Minister David Cameron's
initiative to join any U.S. military assault. Then came U.S. President Barack Obama's
decision to put the issue to a vote before a reluctant Congress. The French government
announced that-unlike in Mali-it would not go it alone in Syria. And United Nations
Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon stated that the chemical weapons inspection team he had
dispatched to Syria would need time to complete its work before determining whether
there was sufficient evidence for the UN to approve the use of force." Fiona Hill, Putin
Scores on Syria: How He Got the Upper Hand -And How He Will Use it, BROOKINGS
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2o13/o9/o6-putin-seores-
syria-hill.
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communication of thirty-five heads of state.92 These reports of U.S.
surveillance in Europe are "eating away at the fabric of trust that is
part of the alliance." According to the Council on Foreign Relations
Senior Fellow Charles A. Kupchan, there is a direct relationship
between the political discomfort with alleged U.S. intelligence
collection and European disappointment about the President's
inability to better balance security and civil liberties.94 Kupchan has
noted that many Europeans feel that Obama "has failed to deliver on
his pledge to clean up some of the excesses left behind by the George
W. Bush administration." 9'
German Chancellor Angela Merkel originally defended the
apparent intelligence cooperation disclosed by Snowden. She pointed
out that Germany had "avoided terrorist attacks thanks to information
from allies."96 But, in the face of new disclosures, she is now discussing
limits on privacy intrusions. Merkel has alluded repeatedly to "Cold
War" tactics and has said spying on friends is unacceptable.97 Her
spokesman has said a mutually-beneficial transatlantic trade deal
requires a level of "mutual trust."98
Chancellor Merkel has been criticized for her apparently feigned
indignation about alleged cooperation with the U.S. Intelligence
Community. "Germany has demanded explanations for Snowden's
allegations of large-scale spying by the NSA, and by Britain via
a programme codenamed 'Tempora,' on their allies including
92 James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official Handed Over
Contacts, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/OCt/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls.
93 Bernard Gwertzman, Interview of Charles A. Kupchan: U.S. Spying Casts Shadow Over
Atlantic Alliance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 29, 2013),
https://secure.www.cfr.org/europe/us-spying-casts-shadow-over-atlantic-
alliance/p31745.
94 1d.
95 Id.
96 Merkel's Public Indignation a Scam: Snowden Says Germans and Other Western States
in Bed with NSA, SIGNS OF THE TIMES (July 7, 2013), http://www.sott.net/article/2637o4-
Merkels-public-indignation-a-scam-Snowden-says-Germans-and-other-Western-states-in-
bed-with-NSA.
97 Id.
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Germany and other European Union states, as well as EU institutions
and embassies."99
The Head of German domestic intelligence has said he knew
nothing about the reported NSA surveillance.' ° Opposition parties
believe otherwise. They claimed that, because German intelligence
activities are coordinated within the Office of the Chancellor, high-
level officials must have known about speculative NSA activities.101
Der Spiegel has reported that the NSA monitored about twenty
million German phone connections and ten million Internet sessions
on an average day and sixty million phone connections on above
average days.0 2 Thus, unconfirmed U.S. intelligence activities are now
an issue that will affect German political leadership and the
diplomatic and intelligence relationships between Germany and the
U.S.
The impact on European Union allies is already seen in the talks
being held between European Union member states and the United
States about American surveillance tactics that may have included
spying on European allies.13 President Obama assured Germany that
the U.S. "takes seriously the concerns of our European allies and
partners.""'
The initiation of a dialogue between the United States and
European Union Members about intelligence collection and
appropriate oversighto5 will also complicate the transatlantic
relationship. Restrictions or legislation that shifts standards of privacy
and data protection will diminish American and European Union
security.
C. France
Tensions in the European Union are not limited only to Germany.
Although not as vocal, the French government has expressed concerns
99 Id.
10l Id.
10, Id.
102 Id.
103 Jackson, supra note 79.
104 Laura Smith-Spark, EUEnvoys Meet Over Claims of U.S. Spying on European Allies,
CNN (July 4, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2o13/o7/o4/world/europe/europe-us-spying/.
105 Jackson, supra note 79.
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about U.S. intelligence activity because of the Snowden leaks. In
response to allegations that the NSA had collected "more than
[seventy] million phone calls in France over a [thirty]-day period,"
U.S. Ambassador to France, Charles Rivkin, was called to meet with
French diplomats. °6  A news release from French President
Francois Hollande's office said he expressed his "deep disapproval
with regard to these practices" and that "such alleged activities would
be unacceptable between allies and friends."° 7
French indignation aside, the disclosures suggest a greater level of
French involvement in global electronic surveillance. According to The
Guardian, the Snowden materials contain high praise for the United
Kingdom's GCHQ's French partner, the General Directorate for
External Security (DGSE). The French are reported to be a "highly
motivated, technically competent partner, who have shown great
willingness to engage on [Internet protocol] issues, and to work with
GCHQ on a 'cooperate and share' basis."'0 8 French media, too, has
reported that the DGSE is involved in the alleged collection. In early
November, La Jeune Politique reported on the strained relations
between Washington, D.C. and Paris. An article published by Le
Monde, detailed "the nature of the NSA's probing into France and...
reported that data on over 70.3 million phone calls and SMS messages
had been recorded by the NSA within a [thirty]-day span."'0 9 These
reports "threw diplomatic relations into question and prompted a visit
by Secretary of State John Kerry."" 0
American officials also noted the compliance of foreign
intelligence services in the collection programs. According to NSA
Director Keith B. Alexander, some documents released by Snowden
"didn't represent data collected by the NSA or any other U.S. agency
and didn't include records from calls within those countries." " In
106 Ed Payne & Khushbu Shah, Report: U.S. Intercepts French Phone Calls on a Massive
Scale', CNN (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.enn.Com/2013/1o/21/world/europe/france-nsa-
spying.
107 Id.
108 Julian Borger, GCHQ and European Spy Agencies Worked Together on Mass
Surveillance, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2013/nov/o1/gchq-europe-spy-agencies-mass-surveillance-snowden.
lo9 Grace Jamieson, French Intelligence DGSE Implicated in Snowden NSA Leaks LA
JEUNE POLITIQUE (Nov. 9, 2013), http://ajeunepolitique.com/2o13/11/o9/french-
intelligence-dgse-implicated-in-snowden-nsa-leaks/.
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congressional testimony, Alexander noted that the data was "instead
from a system that contained phone records collected by the U.S. and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries 'in defense of
our countries and in support of military operations.""' 2 He said the
conclusion that the U.S. collected the data is incorrect. He also stated,
"it's false that it was collected on European citizens.""
3
The disclosures and resulting comments from the U.S.
government put French leaders in a difficult political position. Despite
their initial vocal protest of U.S. intelligence activities, now it appears
as if the French intelligence services were not only in on the collection,
but also provided the data to their American and British partners.
According to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, "France is one of the
U.S.'s closest allies" and that France and the U.S. "work together to
protect the security of their citizens.""' If these claims are accurate,
then it is safe to assume the collaboration and sharing of intelligence
goes beyond those activities illegally disclosed by Snowden.
Assuming that the French do provide intelligence assistance to
and data sharing with NATO, GCHQ, and the NSA, the political
pressures may be so strong as to curtail that assistance and sharing. If
the media reports about French technical collection capability, the
positive GCHQ assessment of French intelligence abilities, and
General Alexander's statements about the reasons for intelligence
relationships are all true, then any reduction in intelligence and data
sharing will reduce the effectiveness of French, United Kingdom,
European Union, NATO, and U.S. intelligence operations. If the
current pressures result in less sharing or more restricted information
exchanges between France and the U.S., then U.S. national security is
impacted.
Some predict that the discomfort with the public disclosure of
critical intelligence activities will result in the establishment of new
norms of intelligence-gathering within the Atlantic Alliance. Rules
such as "no snooping on officials above a certain level; or no
significant intelligence gathering without informing the intelligence
agency of the other side" are being considered."' There is current
legislation in the European parliament that seeks to "tighten privacy
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424o527o23o42oo8o4579656531o586o5o
2.
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114 Payne & Shah, supra note 106.
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laws and make it more difficult for Europeans to share information
with non-European companies like Google and Facebook.""' This will
make intelligence more difficult and more expensive to collect, also
impacting U.S. national security.
D. Latin America
Snowden's illegal disclosures have impacted U.S. national security
by weakening foreign relations not only with Russia and Western
Europe, but also in Latin America. Threats to U.S. national security
from Latin America remain significant. "Economic stagnation, high
rates of violent crime and . . . ruling party efforts to manipulate
democratic institutions to consolidate power, and slow recovery from
natural disasters are challenging [security measures].""' 7 Countries
hostile to the U.S., such as Iran, have been expanding their influence
in Latin America and the Caribbean." 8
Threats from illicit narcotics trafficking emanate primarily from
the Western Hemisphere. Mexico and Colombia are source countries
for the majority of illegal drugs consumed in the U.S., according to the
DNI. Illicit trafficking continues to undermine U.S. security. Some of
the highest violent crime rates are found in Honduras, El Salvador
and Guatemala. "In addition, weak and corrupt institutions in these
countries foster permissive environments for gang and criminal
activity, limit democratic freedom, encourage systemic corruption,
and slow recovery."'' 9 National security threats are abundant in Latin
America, and recent illegal disclosures of classified information will
not help diplomatic or intelligence sharing relationships with
permissive or corrupt governments.
The disclosures have impacted U.S. national security relationships
with Latin America, particularly Brazil. Good intentions over the past
three years to establish a trade deal and Brazilian membership in the
ii6 Id.
117 Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm.,
supra note 27, at 26.
ii8 Id. President Ahmadinejad traveled to the region twice in 2012. Tehran has cultivated
ties to leaders of the Venezuelan-led Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) in
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and maintains cordial relations with
Cuba and Nicaragua. Relations with Tehran offer these governments a way to stake out
independent positions on the international issue of Iran, while extracting financial aid and
investment for economic and social projects.
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United Nations Security Council have been unsuccessful. Brazil's
President Dilma Vana Rousseff has stated that each country has much
to gain from deepening coordination with the United States. It is
reasonable to assume, given the threats to stability and the illicit
narcotics trafficking from Latin America, that the U.S. Intelligence
Community has a partnership with Brazil. If true, then the disclosures
by Snowden will complicate this cooperation. According to the New
York Times, "[d]iplomatic ties have also been damaged, and among
the results was the decision by Brazil's president, Dilma Rousseff, to
postpone a state visit I2° to the United States in protest over revelations
that the agency spied on her, her top aides and Brazil's largest
company, the oil giant Petrobras.' 21 Although an apology 22 may be
enough to have salvage the trade deal, other issues continue to strain
the relationship between Washington and Brasilia.
According to the Council of Foreign Relations, the Snowden
scandal, the White House "response to it and President Dilma
Rousseffs decision to cancel the state visit has [sic] revealed the
weakness of the U.S.-Brazil relationship.' ' 23 Snowden's disclosures are
now spawning an effort within Latin America to strengthen
protections against alleged NSA collection. "According to the AP,
Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Alberto Figueiredo said, '[w]e're going
to talk with our partners, including developed and developing nations,
to evaluate how they protect themselves and to see what joint
measures could be taken in the face of this grave situation.
' 124
Not only is U.S. national security affected by reactions in Brazil,
but U.S. commercial interests as well. According to the Los Angeles
120 Brian Winter, Exclusive: Brazil's Rousseff Wants U.S. Apologyfor NSA Spying,
REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.reuters.eom/article/2o13/o9/o4/us-usa-security-
snowden-brazil-idUSBRE98314N20130904 (Rousseff was due to make a formal state visit
to Washington... to meet U.S. President Barack Obama and discuss a possible $4 billion
jet-fighter deal, cooperation on oil and biofuels technology, as well as other commercial
agreements).
121 Eric Schmitt & Michael Schmidt, Qaeda Plot Leak Has Undermined U.S. Intelligence,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.Com/2013/o9/3o/us/qaeda-
plot-leak-has -undermined-us-intelligence.html?pagewanted=all&r=o.
122 Winter, supra note 120.
123 Julia E. Sweig, The 'Postponement' Requires Hard Truths, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.efr.org/brazil/dear-president-dilma/p31379.
124 Peter Grier, Are Edward Snowden NSA Leaks Messing up US Foreign Relations,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.esmonitor.com/USA/DC-
Decoder/Decoder-Buzz/2013/0903/Are-Edward-Snowden-NSA-leaks-messing-up-US-
foreign-relations.
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Times, President Rousseff is "promoting legislation that would require
technology companies such as Google and Facebook to store data
collected in Brazil on Brazilian soil and therefore submit it to Brazilian
law."'25 In addition, Brazil is now planning to develop a secure e-mail
system to improve the security of government communications
against American spying. Ironically, "President Dilma Rousseff used
the secure messaging channel on Twitter to make the announcement
that she's going to order SERPRO-that country's federal data
processing service-to implement a whole-of-government secure e-
mail system."'26
The reaction in Brazil over the illegal disclosures about alleged
surveillance illustrates the diplomatic impact of the disclosure of
classified information. The relationships with Latin American trade
and diplomatic partners will continue to be tense because of the
Snowden leaks. According to the National Security Strategy, the
"strategic partnerships and unique relationships we maintain with
Canada and Mexico are critical to U.S. national security and have a
direct effect on the security of our homeland."'27 Thus, Snowden's
actions will continue to degrade critical U.S. diplomatic and
information sharing relationships."'
E. Pakistan
The U.S.' relationship with Pakistan has been "tragic and often
tormented."'29 The country's internal instability, complex tribal
dynamics, and political ideology have threatened U.S. security and
international peace. Pakistan's rapidly growing population, "nuclear
arsenal, and relationships with China and India will continue to force
it onto the United States' geostrategic map in new and important ways
over the coming decades."13 With respect to diplomatic relations with
125 Kathleen Hennessey & Vincent Bevins, Brazil Postpones State Visit to U.S. Over
Snowden Spying Leaks, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, available at
http://www.1atimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-f-brazil-us-edward-snowden-spying-
leaks-20130917,0,5186201.story#axzz2jmpqWim6.
126 Richard Chirgwin, Brazil Whacks PRISM With Secure Email Plan, THE REGISTER (Oct.
14, 2013), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil waxes-lyrical on security/.
127 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 25, at 42.
128 Grier, supra note 124.
129 Daniel Markey, No Exitfrom Pakistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 2013),
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the United States, Islamabad is primarily concerned with Afghanistan
and the consequences of the rapidly shrinking U.S. military
presence.1
3 1
The Obama Administration claims that al-Qaeda remains centered
in Pakistan and that this core "remains the most dangerous
component of the larger network .. .,,132 Threats to U.S. national
security will increase if the country's governance and security regress
to historical levels, if the Taliban maintains control of sections of
Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda is not neutralized. According to the
National Security Strategy, "[t]o prevent future attacks on the United
States, our allies, and partners, we must work with others to keep the
pressure on [al-Qaeda] and increase the security and capacity of our
partners in [Afghanistan and Pakistan].' ls
Beyond the al-Qaeda threat, the DNI is concerned about the future
economic issues in Pakistan. With a very limited tax base, poor tax
collection system, and reliance on U.S. foreign aid, the country has no
promise of economic growth. These economic circumstances can
encourage corruption and the acceptance of terrorist groups who
provide much needed currency.
3 4
It is undeniably wise to collect intelligence in regions from which
these types of national security threats can originate. According to The
Washington Post, there are intelligence gaps concerning the security
of Pakistan's nuclear program, chemical and biological weapons
capabilities, and the "loyalties of counterterrorism sources recruited
by the [CIA]."'Is5 These concerns are so pervasive that budget
documents are reported to divide the world into two illicit weapons
categories: Pakistan and everybody else.
3 1
An illegally disclosed summary of the U.S. Intelligence
Community's budget allegedly indicates a significant increase in
131 See generally Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the House Permanent
Select Comm., supra note 27, at 18.
132 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 25, at 20.
133 Id.
134 Worldwide Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm.,
supra note 27, at 18.
135 Greg Miller, Craig Whitlock & Barton Gellman, Top-Secret U.S. Intelligence Files Show
New Levels of Distrust of Pakistan, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-secret-us-intelligence-files-
show-new-levels-of-distrust-of-pakistan/2013/09/02/e19do3c2-lbf- e3-b630-
36617ca664of print.html.
136 Id.
2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
intelligence activities against Pakistan. This increase may indicate a
substantial level of distrust of Pakistan. "They also reveal a more
expansive effort to gather intelligence on Pakistan than U.S. officials
have disclosed."'137 Husain Haqqan, a former Pakistani ambassador to
the United States, supports this belief: "If the Americans are
expanding their surveillance capabilities, it can only mean one thing.
The mistrust now exceeds the trust.' 138
The loss of trust can complicate cooperation with Pakistan
intelligence services, restrict intelligence sharing between the two
countries, and thus reduce the security of both the U.S. and Pakistan.
The Snowden disclosures are undermining an already tense
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. The illegal disclosures will
likely reduce intelligence sharing and military cooperation at a time
when threats for both countries are still extremely grave. The
disclosures have diminished U.S. national security by damaging the
diplomatic and intelligence relationship with a key ally in a region
from whence one of the greatest attacks against the U.S. originated.
The diplomatic and intelligence relationships established over the
past sixty years have been critical to the security of the U.S. national
security is proportionally linked to cooperation with other nations.
The quantity and quality of intelligence sharing with foreign
intelligence services can reduce the burden and expense on U.S
intelligence agencies. Regardless of the veracity of the information
illegally disclosed by Snowden, the tensions it is causing in foreign
relations negatively impact the intelligence sharing and cooperation
with partner nations. Less sharing and cooperation equals reduced
national security for the United States.
Intelligence relationships with foreign security services support
good partnerships between the United States and the partner nation.
These relationships facilitate U.S. access to areas where the U.S. could
not otherwise go. Partners can offer intelligence agility with an ability
to collect information that may take longer in the U.S. They provide
local insight to a particular target with expertise not resident in the
U.S. Intelligence Community. And relationships with foreign
intelligence services may provide cover for U.S. interests by masking
American action under their domestic security or military
organizations. 39 These advantages have been placed at risk by the
recent disclosures of sensitive information.
137 Id.
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III. COMMERCIAL
Diplomatic and intelligence cooperation between nations is vital to
U.S. national security, but so too is the cooperation between the
private and public sectors within the U.S. Policy and technology
developments over the past sixty years have diminished the capacity
of the U.S. government to be first to develop state-of-the-art
technology. This has not always been the case. According to the
Intelligence and National Security Alliance:
Throughout the history of U.S. intelligence, there has
been a necessary partnership between government, the
private sector, and academia to enhance research,
development, manufacturing, and fielding of systems
that support the intelligence mission. A broad range of
innovations including the earliest computers and
dynamic spaceborne collection systems resulted from
this partnership.
Through careful attention and nurturing of these
partnerships, impressive cutting-edge technologies
were developed and utilized on projects including the
U-2, SR-71, CORONA overhead collection systems and
the CRAY supercomputers. 4 '
Most major defense contractors claim to support intelligence
programs throughout the Intelligence Community.' Because the U.S.
national security apparatus apparently depends so heavily on the
private sector, any damage to that relationship will have a
corresponding negative impact on national security. It appears as if
the illegal disclosures by Snowden are diminishing national security
by causing a rift between high-tech firms and the NSA.
http://belfereenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19153/intelligence and international-co
operation.html.
140 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE, CRITICAL ISSUES FOR INTELLIGENCE
ACQUISITION REFORM: INDUSTRY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ACQUISITION PROCESS 1 (Oct. 2008) available at
http://www.insaonline.org/i/p/a/i/d/a/Index.aspx?hkey=d73d5c3e-8oa5- 492b-9fd5-
2f7Caab8b8da.
141 See generally BOOz ALLEN HAMILTON, http://www.boozallen.com (last visited Jan. 25,
2014); NORTHROP GRUMMAN, http://www.northropgrumman.com (last visited Jan. 25,
2014); LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://www.lockheedmartin.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2014);
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A letter sent last year by six leading technology companies
illustrate this rift. On October 31, 2013 Facebook, Google, Apple,
Yahoo, Microsoft and AOL urged the White House to "work with
Congress in addressing ... critical reforms that would provide much
needed transparency and help rebuild the trust of Internet users
around the world."' 2 These companies evidently believe that current
surveillance practices require re-examination: "Our companies believe
that government surveillance practices should also be reformed to
include substantial enhancements to privacy protections and
appropriate oversight and accountability mechanisms for those
programs."'43
This call for reform-perhaps motivated more by corporate
interests than national security interests-may result in less access to
information, less cooperation between the public and private sectors,
and more bureaucratic demands on the Intelligence Community when
accessing data that has little or no impact on the privacy of U.S.
citizens. As noted by the first Assistant Secretary for Policy at the
Department of Homeland Security and former General Counsel at the
NSA Stewart Baker, "[i]n the long run, any effective method of
ensuring privacy is going to have to focus on using technology in a
smart way, not just trying to make government slow and stupid.' 44
Companies such as Facebook, Google, Apple, Yahoo, Microsoft and
AOL handle so much global data and continue to create new ways with
which to connect, it is unwise to undermine any speculative
partnership with these and similar private companies. Information
sharing is already a challenging enough issue for the public and
private sectors.
The same principles described by the 9/11 Commission Report
concerning information within the government, apply to information
sharing between the government and the private sector:
But the security concerns need to be weighed against
the costs. Current security requirements nurture over-
classification and excessive compartmentalization of
information among agencies. Each agency's incentive
structure opposes sharing, with risks . . . but few
142 Letter from Facebook, Google, Apple, Yahoo, Microsoft and AOL, to The Honorables
Leahy, Lee, Conyers, and Sensebrenner (Oct. 31, 2013) available at
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/usa freedom act lettero10-31-13.pdf.
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rewards for sharing information. There are no
punishments for not sharing information. Agencies
uphold a need-to-know culture of information
protection rather than promoting a need-to-share
culture of integration. 45
The current version of the ideas described more than ten years ago
could be that data available to corporations is overly protected and
excessively compartmented within the private sector. Each company
and government agency should incentivize sharing when national
security is at risk. There should be liability for not providing
information, rather than liability protections for sharing information
with the U.S. government. Both public and private sectors must adopt
a culture of integration.
The most recent and likely legislation promoting insufficient, but
improved information sharing was S. 2105, The Cybersecurity Act of
2012.146 This bill, like many other before it, failed to become law
because of mutual mistrust between the government and private
sector and a suspicion of mutual incompetence. 47 Enhanced
information sharing, whether under S. 2105 or any other bill, would
have contributed to national security. Because of the disclosures by
Snowden, there is now no appetite in Washington to pursue any
information exchange between the national security apparatus and
corporate America. According to The Washington Post:
The tone of industry reaction to the NSA revelations
has grown more aggressive since the first stories
appeared in The Washington Post and Britain's
Guardian newspaper in June. Companies that initially
were focused on defending their reputations gradually
began criticizing the government and challenging it in
court. Some companies also have worked to harden
their networks against infiltration. A turning point
came with The Washington Post revealed an NSA
program that collects user information from Google
and Yahoo as it moves among data centers overseas. To
145 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 417.
146 S. 1551, 1 1 3 th Cong. (2013).
147 See generally, Charles Abbott, Cybersecurity Bill Dead after Second U.S. Senate Rebuff,
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/us-usa-eyber-
legislafion-idUSBRE8AE04720121115.
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some, this amounted to a degree of intrusiveness that,
though speculated about by privacy activists, was
beyond what many in the industry thought possible.'48
Snowden's disclosure of classified information has not only chilled
the relationship between Silicon Valley and the U.S. government, but
also it has damaged the bottom line for American technology firms.
According to The World Post, recent losses for Google, Cisco, and
AT&T can be attributed to the alleged role of American technology
companies in the Snowden scandal.' 49 "Election officials in India
canceled a deal with Google to improve voter registration. In China,
sales of Cisco routers dropped [ten] percent in a recent quarter.
European regulators threatened to block AT&T's purchase of the
wireless provider Vodaphone."'' ° With their bottom lines at risk, it is
understandable that American technology companies would distance
themselves from the U.S. government. Given the history of
cooperation between American industry and American government,
this distance is bad for national security, bad for American business
and bad for the U.S. citizens because technological advancement will
be slower and will take longer to penetrate various sectors of the
economy.
The national security impact is clear: Less cooperation between
the U.S. national security departments and agencies will result in less
and more difficult access to data and less and more difficult access to
technical innovation.
IV. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
The American National Security Strategy "begins with a
commitment to build a stronger foundation for American leadership,
because what takes place within our borders will determine our
strength and influence beyond them."'' What is taking place within
148 Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Amid NSA Spying Revelations, Tech Leaders Call
for New Restraints on Agency, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/amid-nsa-spying-revelations-
tech-leaders-call-for-new-restraints-on- agency/2013/1O/31/7f28oaec 4258- 11e3- a751-
f032898f2dbe print.html.
149 Gerry Smith, 'Snowden Effect' Threatens U.S. Tech Industry's Global Ambitions, THE
WORLD POST (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.Com/2o14/01/24/edward-
snowden-tech-industry-n-4596162.html.
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our borders in response to the disclosures of potentially classified
information is reducing U.S. national security by undermining public
confidence in the NSA, the Intelligence Community, and the federal
government. The daily media indictments of one of the premier
intelligence agencies in history is disrespectful to the thousands of
American citizens who work at the NSA, and has presented the public
with an inaccurate image of Intelligence Community oversight. The
loss of public trust resulting from amateur media analysis and by
Snowden's actions is already damaging national security by
distracting national security professionals from their jobs. In our
democracy, reductions in public support and agency credibility will
inevitably result in fewer resources, reduced authority, and additional
scrutiny. For students of national security history, this portends a
pendulum swing back to less information sharing, less authority to
collect intelligence vital to U.S. national security, and a reversion to
less sharing of information within the U.S. government and with
foreign allies.
According to a Pew Research poll conducted shortly after the first
illegal disclosures by The Guardian, "for the first time since 9/11,
Americans are now more worried about civil liberties abuses than
terrorism."'5 2 According to Pew, fifty-six percent of Americans believe
U.S. federal courts have inadequately limited counter-terrorism
telephone and Internet data collection by the government." 3 "An
even larger percentage [seventy percent] believes that the government
uses this data for purposes other than investigating terrorism."'5 4
These data show the misunderstanding of the value of the alleged NSA
programs, despite congressional testimony and declassified
documents that demonstrate that these programs have stopped
violent attacks against the United States and its allies. Regardless of
the value of the disclosed activities, the political reaction has been
swift.
President Obama announced in early August that reforms were
coming for NSA surveillance. Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act and
the role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court are now under
152 Glenn Greenwald, Major Opinion Shifts, in the US and Congress, on NSA Surveillance
and Privacy, THE GUARDIAN, July 26, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2o13/jul/29/poll-nsa-surveillance-privacy-
pew.
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2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAWAND POLICY
review. "Obama wants to let a civil liberties representative weigh in on
the court's deliberations to ensure that an adversarial voice is heard
and will form a high-level group of outside experts to review the U.S.
surveillance effort."' 5  The President has also ordered the
declassification of many documents surrounding the collection of data
in the hope of restoring the public trust damaged by the recent
disclosures.
Congress has also announced its own reforms. The Intelligence
Oversight and Surveillance Reform Act,'56 introduced by Senators Ron
Wyden, Mark Udall, Richard Blumenthal, and Rand Paul, will
"prohibit bulk collection of Americans' records, shield Americans from
warrantless searches of their communications and install a
constitutional advocate to argue significant cases before the secret
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court."'57 No action has been taken
on the bill since its introduction on September 25, 2013.
Congress has also considered an amendment to the Defense
Appropriations bill that would restrict the NSA's access to data. 5 8 It
was the first legislative challenge to programs that the White House,
the ODNI, the Department of Justice, and the NSA have claimed have
stopped violent attacks against the U.S. The amendment was defeated
by twelve votes in the House of Representatives sending a clear
message to the Obama Administration that there is anxiety about the
program. "Though the amendment barely failed, the vote signaled a
clear message to the NSA: [W]e do not trust you."159
The Snowden disclosures may also have larger implications for
other elements of the U.S. government. As a consequence of the
155 Steve Holland & Jeff Mason, Obama Says Reform Ahead for NSA Surveillance
Program, MILWAUKEE WISC. J. SENTINEL (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/usandworld/obama-begins-news-conference- addresses-
nsa-b9972397z1-219024921.html.
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Justin Amash (July 24, 2013), available at http://amash.house.gov/speech/amash-nsa-
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disclosures, Congress and the executive branch considered placing a
political appointee at the head of the NSA and separating the roles of
Director, NSA and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. Although the
President rejected these options, it appears as if dramatic shifts in
well-functioning structures would be considered because of the
sensational media coverage and political pressure.
With the reduction in potential legal authority for the NSA, public
sentiments against NSA surveillance that has contributed so much to
national security, and the pressures that are a consistent feature of
budget negotiations, can reductions to the NSA budget be far behind?
With less money, less authority, and less credibility, the NSA will soon
have fewer people, less data, and a weakened ability to contribute to
national security. According to top agency counsels, reforms under
consideration may reduce Americans privacy in an effort to enhance
it. 6° Lawyers from the Intelligence Community are now arguing
against certain reforms, in support of the status quo. 6'
Perhaps it was inevitable that the national security apparatus
constructed since 9/11 would be dismantled when Americans no
longer view the threat to the U.S. as starkly as they did on September
11, 2001. Amid seeming crises of political dysfunction, government
shutdowns, and persistent unemployment, perhaps the public no
longer sees al-Qaeda, Iran's nuclear program, Muslim extremism, and
nuclear proliferation as providing the NSA a sufficient justification to
access metadata.
As noted by lawyer, diplomat, writer, and philosopher Joseph de
Maistre, "[e]very nation has the government it deserves."'' 2 If the
citizens of the American republic demand a reduction in their own
security as a result of actions taken in violation of laws their
representatives established, then we will not only get the government
we deserve, but also the level of security we have chosen.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the legitimacy-or lack thereof-of Snowden's
actions, the material he has revealed in violation of law, regulation,
and oath has placed U.S. security at risk. The disclosures have resulted
in significant damage to diplomatic relationships with countries that
160 John Hudson, Top Obama Lawyers: Reforming the NSA Could Hurt Americans'
Privacy, FOREIGN POLICY BLOG (Nov. 4, 2013), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com.
1611d.
162 JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 353 (Justin Kaplan ed., 1 7 th ed.
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share intelligence with the U.S., damage to domestic commercial
relationships between the U.S. public and private sectors leading to
less information sharing and innovation, and damage to the public
confidence in the NSA leading to fewer resources and authority to
protect the U.S. in the manner that it has done so since 9/11. The
disclosures will also facilitate operational changes in the behavior of
current adversaries' practices and attention to the protection of their
information. It will become more difficult, more expensive, and more
time consuming to collect and analyze information on terrorist
groups, foreign governments, and foreign militaries.
Our Republic is resilient and will survive the exposure of the
"plumbing" of the NSA's intelligence apparatus. 163 Surviving will be
more dangerous, more expensive, and take more time than reforms
would have required absent Snowden's illegal activities. Just as
Snowden must do on his own, we must all ask ourselves if the
transparency that he has forced onto the system is worth the
diminishing of American security.
163 See generally comments from Michael V. Hayden during the Washington Post Live's
Cyber Summit. Defending Our Data: Can Government and Industry Work Together?
WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/postlive/conferences/cybersecurity-2013/.
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